How will Trump’s return affect Asia?

The re-election of new US president Donald Trump poses potential challenges for Taiwan’s relations in Southeast Asia as US policies and broader global dynamics change. While his first term was marked by direct conflict with China, the second term could bring new complexities that would put Taiwan in a difficult position, especially as Southeast Asian countries often find themselves caught between Washington and Beijing.

Taiwan’s main problem lies in the intensifying US-China rivalry, which is forcing Southeast Asian countries to join one of the two powers. Countries with deep trade ties with both countries, such as Vietnam, are already on edge over Beijing’s stance on the South China Sea disputes. A more aggressive US approach under Trump could force these countries to remain dependent on the US or China, especially in trade and security. For Taiwan, this dynamic is problematic because China could force Southeast Asian countries to cut ties with Taiwan in exchange for economic or political incentives. Countries may limit relations with Taiwan to maintain stability with China, ultimately reducing Taiwan’s regional influence.

Trump’s hawkish stance on China, particularly on the South China Sea, could increase military tensions in Southeast Asia, a region already sensitive to US-China rivalry. The Philippines, for example, won an arbitration case against China in 2016, and Trump’s subsequent support for maritime claims has increased regional risks. Taiwan’s claims in the South China Sea overlap with those of the Philippines, Vietnam and China, which could intensify local disputes.

If Trump’s second term brings a more aggressive military posture, Southeast Asian countries, most of which prefer neutrality, may feel pressure to avoid close ties with Taiwan to avoid antagonizing China. The country’s security is deeply tied to the stability of the Taiwan Strait, which complicates the country’s regional position. Moreover, its participation in US-led security initiatives could antagonize Beijing and deter Southeast Asian countries from cooperating with Taipei on security issues. This dynamic could limit Taiwan’s ability to strengthen regional security alliances, even though it shares Southeast Asia’s concerns about China’s regional ambitions.

Trump’s “America First” policies, which focus on protectionism and bilateral trade, could also disrupt global trade and supply chains, complicating Taiwan’s economic activities in Southeast Asia. The US-China trade war during Trump’s first term caused Taiwanese companies such as Foxconn to shift production to countries such as Vietnam and Thailand, strengthening those economies but also increasing Chinese scrutiny. Vietnam, for example, has been criticized by the United States for its trade surplus, despite gains from trade exchanges.

If Trump continues to prioritize protectionism, Southeast Asian countries may face a delicate balancing act between aligning with the United States and avoiding deeper ties with Taiwan in order to maintain good relations with China. Vietnam, which values ​​neutrality, may be less willing to strengthen economic ties with the country if US-China tensions escalate. If Trump accelerates the divergence with Beijing, many Southeast Asian countries that are heavily dependent on Chinese trade may prioritize those relationships over partnerships with Taipei. This change could limit Taiwan’s economic influence in the region, despite being one of the largest foreign investors.

Southeast Asian countries have carefully balanced their autonomy amid rising US-China tensions; But Trump’s assertive policies could complicate their neutral stance by forcing them to choose sides. This dynamic puts Taiwan in a delicate position, as it could be seen as a flashpoint in the region’s balancing act between superpowers. Countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia, which prioritize protecting their own strategic interests, may limit their relations with Taiwan in order not to strain their ties with China and disrupt the balance they aim to maintain. Fear of provoking China leads these countries to refrain from taking strong positions against Taiwan, limiting the scope for deeper interaction.

Further complicating matters, Trump’s preference for bilateral rather than multilateral agreements could restrict Taiwan’s access to regional and global frameworks. Southeast Asian countries may be cautious about including Taiwan in multilateral groups such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) because doing so risks provoking China. Trump’s earlier withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) exemplifies his transactional approach to diplomacy; this may not be compatible with Taiwan’s aspirations for regional integration and multilateral partnerships. Taiwan’s efforts to join major economic groups such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) also face challenges as Southeast Asian countries may feel forced to prioritize their relations with China. Trump’s dual focus has left a void that China has sought to fill with initiatives such as RCEP, further complicating Taiwan’s objectives. If Trump continues this approach in his second term, Southeast Asian countries may be reluctant to support Taiwan’s CPTPP membership, fearing possible repercussions from China.

Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy could also further complicate Taiwan’s regional strategy. In June, he voiced his displeasure with the country’s role in the semiconductor industry, claiming that the United States helped build that industry while accusing Taipei of not contributing enough to Washington’s defense costs. He suggested that Taiwan should assume more responsibility for its defense and even called for the United States to treat the country as an “insurance policy” rather than as a dependent country. Trump also proposed imposing tariffs on Taiwanese chips, saying they were “stealing” U.S. jobs. These comments raised concerns about the direction of US policy towards Taiwan in his second term. With U.S. priorities shifting and policies frequently reversing, Southeast Asian countries may find it difficult to rely on Washington’s continued support for Taipei. This uncertainty could lead them to strengthen ties with China instead of Taiwan, ignoring Taiwan’s interests. Trump’s second term could deprioritize Taiwan’s non-political engagement strategies, such as health, education, and sustainable development—areas where the nation has gained goodwill without directly challenging China. For example, Taiwan’s medical support during the COVID-19 pandemic has been well received in countries such as Thailand and the Philippines. But such cooperative initiatives may be sidelined as Trump likely focuses on military and economic competition, limiting Taiwan’s ability to foster long-term, conflict-free partnerships in Southeast Asia.

Trump’s second-term policy could create potential challenges for Taiwan’s engagement in the region. The intensifying US-China rivalry, combined with protectionist trade policies and greater focus on military issues, may push Southeast Asian countries to take a more cautious stance towards Taiwan. While these countries carefully balance their relationships with both superpowers, they may need to adopt a low-profile, non-provocative strategy to avoid escalating tensions with China while continuing to benefit from China’s economic and technological might. Taiwan’s ability to forge deeper economic, non-diplomatic ties with Southeast Asia under Trump’s policies may be restricted and require flexibility in navigating this complex and evolving environment.

Tran Thi Mong Tuyen is a doctoral student at National Cheng Chi University and a former researcher at Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a visiting scholar at National Taiwan University.