Israel’s limited missile attack on Iran could be the beginning of a broader attack

It is a measure of the high levels of tension in the Middle East that the purely military targets Israel has chosen are perceived to be the most limited of its options. Since Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles against Israel on October 1, officials close to Benjamin Netanyahu have expressed the Israeli prime minister’s view that a “historic opportunity” had opened to deal a strategic blow to Iran.

Instead, Israel mostly hit Iran’s Russian-made S-300 air defense radars and missile launchers, avoiding its nuclear facilities. Nor did the Israelis destroy vital economic targets such as oil export terminals. This shows that for once Israel is heeding pressure from its American ally. This may also indicate that Israel is laying the groundwork for a later, much more devastating attack.

The key to understanding Israel’s decision is America’s political calendar. With America’s presidential election just ten days away, Israel faced the choice of retaliating against military targets with America’s tacit approval or defying President Joe Biden’s clear warnings on the eve of the vote not to attack nuclear or energy-related facilities. Second, it would jeopardize future cooperation with the Democratic administration if Kamala Harris wins on November 5. There is always an opportunity for future attacks if Donald Trump, who has already expressed support for Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear program, wins.

How effective were Israel’s attacks? So far there is little evidence to be sure. Israeli officers claim that they have destroyed most of Iran’s advanced air defense capabilities and, as a result, their air force can operate freely in Iranian airspace. If true, this means that a future Israeli attack could be much more comprehensive.

According to Israeli security sources, most of the targets this time were hit by air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs) ​​launched from aircraft well outside the range of Iranian defenses. Israel’s ALBM stockpile is limited, and a more intense air strike campaign against Iran would require large numbers of jets using shorter-range munitions. If Israel’s claims about this attack are true, this is now possible. It will take months for Iran to rebuild its air defenses, especially if its Russian suppliers need their own batteries for their war with Ukraine.

Iran still has many missiles and drones and could launch a third attack on Israel. However, it is not possible to rush into such a move. Not only would this risk provoking a much more damaging counter-attack from Israel, but Iran’s leaders are also watching America’s elections carefully. The most important concern of Iran’s religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is the stability of his regime. Both courses of action—attacking Israel again or opening fire—carry risks. Tehrans saw their city under military attack for the first time since the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Not responding will be perceived as a sign of weakness.

But retaliating can have devastating consequences. In this attack, Israel may have disabled one of Iran’s most important defenses: S-300 batteries. Iran has already significantly reduced the protection offered by its missile arsenal to Lebanon’s Shiite militia group Hezbollah as a threat to Israel. Most of Iran’s precision-guided missiles were destroyed in Israel’s recent air strikes on Lebanon.

Iran is trying to downplay the Israeli attack, at least for now; Semi-official news agency Tasnim labeled Israel’s claims “complete lies” and said only “limited damage” had been done. Tehran will certainly bide its time before deciding whether and how to respond.

This also has domestic consequences for Mr. Netanyahu. Raising expectations, his political rivals are already accusing him of missing an opportunity. Before the strike, former prime minister and future right-wing rival Naftali Bennett called on the government to “destroy Iran’s nuclear program.” Yair Lapid, the centrist leader of the opposition, said that “the decision not to attack strategic and economic targets is Iran’s nuclear program.” “I was wrong.”

This time, Mr. Netanyahu chose to show strategic patience, at least for now. But if it is willing to pay the political price of choosing a more measured course of action against Iran, this almost certainly means it will be less open to pressures for a ceasefire on other fronts on which Israel is waging war: Gaza and Lebanon. Add to that pressure from his far-right allies, who have the power to overthrow his government at the next session of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, which begins on October 27, and any halt to Israel’s other wars seems less likely.

The nature of this attack on Iran shows that America can still shape Israeli policy if it cares to apply serious pressure. Israel has repeatedly escalated the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon this year, despite the insistence of the Biden administration. This time, it has acted in full coordination and has so far avoided a move that could cause both a regional fire and an increase in global energy prices. But the risk is that this attack was only the beginning of a more serious attack to follow.

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Published under license from The Economist. Original content can be found at www.economist.com.