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The lawyer who violated the suspension is “unfit for the profession”

The lawyer who violated the suspension is “unfit for the profession”

The lawyer who violated the suspension is “unfit for the profession”

Lawyer: The disciplinary court’s decision was appropriate

The Supreme Court upheld the decision to disbar a lawyer who continued to represent himself as a lawyer while he was suspended from duty.

Mr Justice Kerr said:: “I regret to say that I agree with the court that (Peter) Wareing is unfit to practice law.”

Mr Wareing, who was summoned in 2004 and completed his pupillage in 2013, was disbarred in May but details were not published pending his appeal.

He was sanctioned twice by the Bar Association disciplinary court before appearing in court again in July 2021. suspended for six months.

He was later charged with handling five cases during his suspension.

Just before starting, Mr Wareing asked the Bar Standards Board (BSB) if he could practice as a paralegal. He responded that this was “a question the firm should be asking” the Solicitors Regulation Authority.

The BSB also stated that a suspended lawyer should not practice as a lawyer, present himself as a lawyer when providing legal services, represent himself as being authorized by the BSB to provide reserved legal services, or identify himself as a lawyer when providing non-legal services. a lawyer without announcing the restraining order.

The main allegation was that Mr Wareing gave the impression that he was working as a solicitor, the May court heard.

The BSB allegedly tried to pretend and pretend that Mr Wareing “was suspended from training never happened; and to the extent that disclosure of his status is necessary, he has adopted the method of being ‘attorney’s attorney’ without making any apparent effort to meet the inherent definition of that role”.

It continued: “He did not adequately disclose his suspension from the military to the courts or (as submitted) to opponents who often came to light only through their own investigations but were unaware of his suspension and assumed that he had practiced or continued to practice law.”

The court rejected Mr Wareing’s argument that the BSB’s response was approval for him to act as a solicitor’s agent, saying it “did not give him any such assurance, but rather told him what not to do”.

The court found that he had acted dishonestly and breached the public trust by portraying himself as a lawyer on four of five matters, agreed to engage in public access without the necessary qualifications on three matters, and carried out a reserved legal activity (see right of audience when he was not entitled to do so in two).

He was cleared of acting dishonestly and acting as a lawyer while suspended from office.

At the next disbarment hearing, the court said that each incident in itself would justify at least further suspension, particularly in light of Mr Wareing’s previous disciplinary history.

On appeal, Mr Wareing argued that the court should accept that he had acted reasonably in reliance on permission “apparently granted” by the BSB to practice as a barrister’s agent “without breaching the terms of his suspension”.

Kerr J found nothing in the BSB’s response that “encouraged Mr Wareing to assume the role of solicitor’s agent”.

He continued: “The most that can reasonably be inferred from this is that it does not imply any direct prohibition against doing so.”

The fact that Mr Wareing acted as counsel for a solicitor on record, as in the two cases, was not a breach of the suspension. In another, there was no clear breach of the restraining order simply by attending the employment tribunal hearing; because he didn’t need the right to meet there.

Kerr J said: “These points were noted by the court and reflected in its decision.”

Moreover, for these violations “it is not correct to say that the court did not consider sanctions less severe than disbarment” and disbarment was not disproportionate or excessive.

The court followed correct procedure in considering the sanction and it was “not a realistic argument” to say that its decision was outside the bounds of reasonable judgment.

Kerr J said the tribunal was “clearly right”, given that the tribunal had found that he “intended to circumvent suspension”, had already had a poor disciplinary record, had shown a “lack of insight” and had failed to engage in the disciplinary process. Moving up from the normal starting point for misconduct attracting a suspension of at least 12 months.

The court adjourned the hearing at Mr Wareing’s request and postponed the hearing until five months later, when he said he could do so. He only said he got his dates wrong two weeks before the hearing, and the court decided to proceed in his absence.

Kerr J once again said that he could make no mistake either in the process or in the outcome. Mr Wareing had his “head in the sand when it came to setting dates” and did not properly engage with the disciplinary process.