10 Reasons Why Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Is a Bad Idea

Despite rapid growth and modernization related to Russian And Chinese nuclear forces, many believe in it United States should not compete, but rather minimize It should have as much of its own nuclear capacity as possible. By minimizing our own capabilities and depriving ourselves of any viable option other than retaliatory city sacking (so the theory goes), we demonstrate that we do not intend to attack first, thus eliminating the enemy’s incentive to attack us first. Moreover, if the enemy is convinced that any use of nuclear weapons will lead to the destruction of the city (because we leave ourselves with no alternative), he will never risk a nuclear war and, at worst, limit himself to conventional war. We much prefer it.

Finally, restraint by the United States would eliminate the incentive for Russia and China to increase their own nuclear capabilities, prevent a costly arms race, and ideally lead to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This proposal is called minimum deterrence, and has been for the past four years: until recently, actual By systematically underestimating the extent of the nuclear threat from Russia and China, the current administration’s policy has been to convince the public that increasing US forces is not necessary. Even so, many outside the administration insist on an even lower “minimum.” Both of these views are dangerously wrong, and here’s why:

1) “When we build, they build; “When we cut, they build.” he said so President Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of Defense Harold Brown fifty years ago. This truth has never been more clear than today. Russia withdrew from the agreement despite extreme and persistent pressure from the administration. New START Treaty, The only remaining arms control agreement to limit the size of the force of any of the nuclear powers. China, which has never been a party to the arms limitation agreement, Expanding its nuclear forces with dizzying speed. There no historical evidence Unilateral, self-imposed restrictions on US forces always lead to reciprocal changes Russian or Chinese programs. For better or worse, Pandora’s box was opened eighty years ago and will not be closed. The nuclear arms race has been going strong ever since, and the only choice facing the United States is whether to join the race or not.

2) Contrary to popular belief, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) were never “invincible.” Today, due to the vulnerability of U.S. missile silos and the failure to alert U.S. bombers, ballistic missile submarines at sea are the only U.S. nuclear forces that can survive an enemy’s initial attack. During the Cold War, both sides deployed anti-submarine assets to track enemy missile submarines and, in the event of war, intend to destroy them without receiving orders to fire. United States, particularly successful A country that knew how to track Soviet SSBNs without knowing they were being tracked should know better than to assume that its submarines could never be touched. The idea that the United States can achieve a small, simple, unchanging but permanently assured minimum power without the need for an arms race constitutes an absurdly dangerous gamble at best, pure wishful thinking at worst.

3) Yes, it is possible to win a nuclear war not only in relative terms but also in absolute terms. It is also possible to lose. The first and most effective way to win is to launch a surprise attack that cripples the enemy’s ability to retaliate. Due to extreme money tightness Crippled America’s command and control systemThe danger of such an attack is already very great. The second way to win is to destroy a specific limited set of targets (e.g., enemy nuclear forces, enemy military forces in the front, or key military bases behind the front, or all three) while maintaining a safe reserve to deter the enemy. fired all its weapons in retaliation. With modern, accurate, variable-effect weapons, it is entirely possible to use nuclear weapons to decisive effect on the front lines without inflicting greater casualties than could be expected from the liberal use of high explosives. The surprise destruction of the entire US Navy in its ports could be achieved with the death of (at most) a few thousand civilians. Minimum deterrence would require the United States to respond to such an attack with national suicide. It doesn’t make any sense, so why would anyone believe it?

4) Even if you believe that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is deterrence (i.e., you don’t care what happens if nuclear weapons are actually used), Russia and China do not believe that minimal deterrence is sufficient to achieve their goals. security needs. So why would they discourage a policy whose validity they do not recognize?

5) When the shoe was on the other foot, the USA itself was not deterred by “minimum deterrence”. From the 1950s to the early 1960s, the current situation was reversed and Russia was in a difficult situation. big disadvantage On the issue of nuclear weapons (though not for lack of trying), the United States planned and intended to immediately launch an all-out war at the beginning of any conflict, even at the cost of the deaths of millions of U.S. civilians, to offset the relative weakness of NATO’s base. forces in Europe. Moreover, the president of the United States seriously considered launching an initiative. preventive war To destroy the Russian nuclear arsenal before it grows any bigger. After achieving nuclear parity and then a modest superiority over the United States, Russia was deterred from launching an all-out war and thereafter planned to launch only a limited nuclear war to compensate for NATO’s still inadequate general-purpose forces. Preventive war was no longer even on the table. In other words, “minimum deterrence” clearly failed to deter Washington, while nuclear parity and superiority clearly succeeded.

6) Nuclear weapons are the only weapon that can seriously harm the United States. Unlike all other major powers, the United States is relatively defenseless against invasion and conquest unless all of its general-purpose forces are destroyed by nuclear weapons. Thus, while U.S. general purpose forces defend U.S. allies, nuclear weapons defend the United States itself and everyone else. Surely, then, America, of all nations, should err on the side of caution when it comes to the size of its nuclear forces?

7) All current US nuclear programs, including modernization, cost overruns, etc. cost about 7.5 percent total defense expenditure in the next ten years. Moreover, it would cost almost nothing to greatly enhance U.S. nuclear capabilities. When the New START Treaty was signed, the United States kept a large number of warheads in storage as a “hedge” in case the treaty failed. Loading these warheads will approximately double the number of deployed warheads. 100 million dollarsor 0.0001 percent of the annual defense budget. Russia ended the agreement almost two years ago; but US warheads are still in storage today.

8) When it comes down to it, the Biden administration has implicitly and indirectly threatened a “massive” response at best to Russia’s nuclear attack on Ukraine. traditional retaliation. Unfortunately, “massive” conventional attacks are not that big compared to nuclear weapons; This is a fact that the average person can probably appreciate but that escapes our leaders. If such a ridiculous suggestion were implemented, Americans would quickly discover what it felt like to be a Native American in the Frontier Wars. This was not inevitable. For example, if the United States had more than two hundred tactical nuclear weapons to counter Russia’s thousands, it could have responded to a Russian nuclear attack by supplying some to Ukraine and stayed out of the resulting conflagration entirely. Instead, the United States is already backed into what we often call “minimum deterrence,” which is exactly where the administration wants the United States to be.

9) Minimum deterrence provides nothing. Although some are more honest about this than others, all but the most extreme advocates of minimum deterrence seek to equip the United States solely with the capacity to slaughter large numbers of enemy civilians. ( most extreme its advocates are also trying to deprive the United States of this capability). During a crisis, minimum deterrence offers a country only the options of surrender, defeat in a limited nuclear war, or destruction in all-out war. And if the bubble does indeed rise, the United States will not be able to prevent its allies from being overrun by nuclear-armed armies; It cannot prevent the enemy’s nuclear weapons from killing friendly civilians, or even destroy the enemy’s war-supporting industries. Above all, the price of inflicting heavy damage on enemy civilians is accepting an even greater loss for us. Paradoxically, a larger and more powerful nuclear force capable of attacking all military targets could pursue options other than the indiscriminate destruction of urban areas, ultimately resulting in fewer casualties on both sides. We cannot guarantee this outcome, but we can guarantee that the only possible outcome of using minimal deterrent force in a real nuclear war will be mass destruction or surrender, because that is the whole point.